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EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS IN LOCAL LAND USE 
DECISIONS 
Jennie L. Pettit* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the turn of the century, land owners were free to use 
their land for its economically best-suited purpose, provided they 
acted within the limitations of their estate and created no nuisance 
or trespass against their neighbor's property.l Today, land use or-
dinances restrict this freedom to use land for the best economic 
purpose. Instead, legislatures determine land use by the long-term 
interests of communities as a whole rather than as incidences of 
individual land ownership. 2 These land use regulations are ubiqui-
tous, and often, in effect, sever development rights from land own-
ership by dictating how land can be used. The result is a conflict 
between the land owner's notion of property rights and the extensive 
statutory regulation of land use. Inconsistent judicial review of ex 
parte communications occurring in the land use context further com-
plicates this conflict. 
Within any given municipality, elected legislatures make land use 
decisions. Commonly, these legislatures enact and amend ordi-
* Citations Editor, 1987-88, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Fasano v. Board o/County Commissioners o/Washington County: Land Use Planning 
and Zoning in Oregon, 10 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 95 (1973) [hereinafter Fasano Comment]. 
2 See R. FREILICH & E. STUHLER, THE LAND USE AWAKENING 2, 281 (1981). The U.S. 
Supreme Court has upheld land use ordinances as an extension of the governmental power to 
abate nuisances. Id. 
For cases supporting government power to regulate land use see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 
U. S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (abating a nuisance by prohibiting the use of land for a certain purpose 
is a valid exercise of police power); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (ordinance 
prohibiting manufacture of bricks within specified areas of the city is a valid exercise of police 
power). 
The Court then extended this police power to zoning and enabled local governments to 
restrict uses and intensities of uses in certain areas of their communities without a showing 
of nuisance. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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nances. Various types of elected and appointed land use boards3 
administer the provisions of these ordinances. 4 Land use statutes 
often require notice to interested parties about land use changes, 
public hearings,5 record keeping, and the opportunity for all parties 
to present and rebut evidence. 6 
An ex parte communication7 is a communication between the de-
cisionmaker and an interested party that takes place without public 
notice and outside the record. 8 Ex parte communications violate 
statutes and notions of fairness, and lead to the public's perception 
that land use boards are subject to special influence. These com-
munications may actually encourage such influence. Courts create 
confusion between the administrative and legislative standards when 
they review an appealed land use decision and prohibit the ex parte 
communications of elected officials but do not object to those made 
by appointed officials. 
Administrative land use decisions are subject to judicial review in 
all states. 9 According to the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, 
judicial review by a court of record is available to any person ag-
grieved by a decision. 10 Depending on the jurisdiction, an aggrieved 
person may obtain this review by direct appeal to the courts, a 
certiorari proceeding, or through an action for a writ of mandamus. 11 
While the procedure may vary, the essential character of judicial 
3 This Comment will hereinafter use "board" to refer to city councils, planning and zoning 
commissions, boards of zoning adjustment and zoning appeals, county commissions, and pol-
lution control boards as a group of local decisionmakers that deal with the interpretation and 
application of land use ordinances. 
4 See 1 SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING AND ZONING 112-
13 (1960). 
5 The hearing is also where people develop attitudes toward the zoning process, depending 
upon their experience, of either respect, dislike, or disgust. [d. at 135. 
6 A. Sirois, Conflicts of Interest Law as it Relates to Beacon Hill and Back Bay Architectural 
Commissions' Members 16 (April 21, 1986) (unpublished memorandum). 
7 This Comment deals with ex parte "communications," where there is a verbal exchange 
between decisionmaker and interested party, as opposed to ex parte "contacts," which may 
include the mere presence of an influencing party or previous employment. Certain quotations 
used may refer to ex parte "contacts" but their intent also refers to the more narrow "com-
munication" aspect; the word contact will be used in reference to these ex parte communica-
tions. 
8 Town of Ottawa v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 129 Ill. App. 3d 121, 126, 472 N.E.2d 150, 
154 (1984) (telephone call that was inconsequential yet succeeded in transmitting influential 
information without notice to opposing parties was considered an ex parte communication). 
94 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 25.01 (3d ed. 1986). 
10 STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7 (1926), reprinted in 4 R. ANDERSON, supra 
note 9, at § 25.02. Many states have adopted the main features of the Act. 4 R. ANDERSON, 
supra note 9, at § 25.02. 
11 [d. at § 25.01. 
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review of land use decisions is similar among the states. 12 None of 
the standards of review currently used by state courts to determine 
whether an ex parte communication is basis for vacation provides 
guidelines for elected and appointed officials to prevent appealable 
error. 
A local government can increase both fairness and the perception 
of fairness by policing appointed land use board members to prevent 
ex parte communications and by allowing elected land use board 
members to communicate with any interested party. Courts create 
confusion by treating appointed administrative boards as legislatures 
and vice versa. This Comment proposes guidelines for land use 
decisionmaking and judicial review of land use decisions. These 
guidelines advocate applying traditional notions of legislative and 
administrative standards regarding ex parte communications to the 
area of land use law. Changes are needed in order to restore integrity 
and clarity to the land use decisionmaking process. 
Ex parte communications become a serious problem when deci-
sionmakers are uncertain of whether to function politically or adju-
dicatively. A primary goal of this Comment is to clarify the role 
decisionmakers perform in terms of the body that they serve. This 
clarification will prevent situations where a well-meaning decision-
maker has ex parte contacts and a court later overturns an otherwise 
valid decision. The proposed approach clarifies and protects devel-
opers', neighbors', and city officials' rights and duties, and allows the 
long-term interests of the entire community to playa role in resolv-
ing land use controversies. 
Section II of this Comment outlines the traditional legislative, 
judicial, and administrative local government decisionmaking mod-
els. Each model is held to a standard of review regarding ex parte 
communications that best meets the requirements of each type of 
office. Section III then discusses each of the three current standards 
of review that courts use to decide whether an ex parte communi-
cation is basis for vacating a land use decision: the legislative/quasi-
judicial distinction, clear showing of bias, and appearance of fairness. 
The conclusion of Section III is that the current standards do not 
reflect accurately the roles of elected and appointed officials. Section 
IV then advocates treating elected board members as legislators and 
appointed board members as administrators and holding each to their 
respective traditional standards in regard to ex parte communica-
tions. 
12Id. at § 25.02. 
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II. TRADITIONAL MODELS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
DECISIONMAKING 
State and municipal decisionmaking is a function of legi::;latures, 
courts, and administrative bodies. The traditional legislative deci-
sionmaking model involves elected representatives who enact sta-
tutory law. 13 This model consists of a process of lobbying and bar-
gaining where legislators speak with interested parties to determine 
their constituents' views. 14 A legislator is likely to be voted out of 
office if he or she does not heed the public consensus. Therefore, 
reviewing courts consider ex parte communications a necessary part 
of the legislator's duties. 15 
In comparison, the traditional judicial decisionmaking model in-
volves an impartial judge who applies pre-existing legal norms to a 
specific fact pattern. 16 Although local judges may be elected or ap-
pointed, statutes prohibit all judges from speaking outside of the 
courtroom with parties interested in the outcome of a case. 17 Ex 
parte communications are not necessary for an effective judiciary, 
whereas effective legislatures are dependent on such communica-
tions. 
Traditionally, state and federal administrators act within a partic-
ular, defined area. 18 At the local level, statutes create and govern 
administrative bodies. As with judges, administrative decisionmak-
ers apply general rules to particular situations and rely on fixed 
decisionmaking procedures. 19 According to the Revised Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act, to carry out this public duty admin-
istrators must not communicate, directly or indirectly, with any 
person or party except upon notice and opportunity for all parties 
to participate. 20 
13 See generally H. READ, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, 1 (1973). Commentators consider 
legislation the most important instrument for law-making. [d. 
14 [d. at 424-26. 
15 E.g., City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768,780,537 P.2d 375,382, 122 Cal. 
Rptr. 543, 550 (1975) (council members have an obligation to discuss issues with their con-
stituents); Turf Valley Assoc. v. Zoning Bd. of Howard County, 262 Md. 632, 644, 278 A.2d 
581, 580 (1971) (campaign promise to support a position does not disqualify a board member 
from voting on that issue). 
16 See M. SHAPIRO, COURTS, A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, 1 (1981). 
17 ABA CODE OF JUDICAL CONDUCT Canon 5 §A(4) (1983) ("[aJ judge should ... neither 
initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending 
proceeding"). 
18 For example, housing inspectors, zoning agencies, licensing officers, street authorities, 
and personnel boards all operate out of administrative agencies at the local level. Merrill, The 
Local Administrative Agencies, 22 VAND. L. REV. 775 (1969). 
19 M. SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 20. 
20 REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 13 (1970), reprinted in K. 
------ --
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Administrative bodies not only affect rights of private parties 
through adjudication but also through rulemaking. 21 Unfortunately, 
courts have allowed this legislative-like function of rulemaking to 
affect adversely the way they review local land use decisions. For 
example, Oregon courts separate quasi-judicial actions from legis-
lative actions and apply different standards when reviewing a land 
use body's ex parte communications.22 The court does not consider 
whether the board was elected or appointed. 23 Thus, administrative 
decisionmakers do not know how to act with regard to ex parte 
communications, because they do not know whether the reviewing 
court will consider a decision legislative or quasi-judicial24 until after 
the decision is made and reviewed. 
Legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies co-exist within 
the local government decisionmaking process. When land use deci-
sionmakers adhere to traditional standards of review, judicial review 
of government decisions is unambiguous and predictable. In the area 
of land use law, however, when courts apply different standards of 
review based on the type of decision the board has made, instead of 
its traditional function, uncertainty is the result. 
III. CURRENT STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Local land use controversies arise in a variety of contexts. Some 
controversies concern very large projects, such as urban renewal or 
freeway construction. Most local land use disputes, however, are on 
a much smaller scale. 25 One classic example of a local land use dispute 
involves a real estate developer who wants to install a gas station 
or apartment building where an existing house stands, and the neigh-
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 584 (3d ed. 1972). About three-quarters of the states now have 
administrative legislation based on the Model Act. [d. at § 1.04. 
21 K. DAVIS, supra note 20 at 1. 
22 Sullivan, From Kroner to Fasano: An Analysis of Judicial Review of Land Use Regu-
lation in Oregon, 10 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 358, 361 (1974). 
23 Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Washington County, 264 Or. 574, 579, 507 P.2d 23, 
25-26 (1973) (judicial review begins with a characterization of the nature of the decision). 
24 Quasi-judicial refers to functions that are not purely and completely judicial in nature but 
have qualities or incidents resembling a judicial setting. Hyson v. Montgomery County Coun-
cil, 242 Md. 55, 62, 217 A.2d 558, 582-83 (1966). Differentiation between quasi-judicial and 
legislative decisions becomes even more difficult when functions are mixed, blended or com-
bined within the same board. [d. 
25 Rose, New Models for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 Nw. V.L. REV., 1155, 1156-57 
(1984-85). The large projects are highly publicized, debated, and involve many different 
interest groups, thus, creating a relatively open process of local decisionmaking that is less 
subject to procedural criticism. See id. at 1159. 
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bors object. 26 The interested parties may include the developer and 
the neighbors, with some form of city board or official in the middle. 
Within this setting, ex parte communications between the city de-
cisionmakers and the neighbors or developers are common practice. 27 
Ex parte communications are a problem because state courts de-
cide whether an ex parte communication is basis for reversal de-
pending on the board's decision, rather than the type of decision-
making body.28 The courts' characterization of final decisions leads 
to uncertainty. Prior to making a decision, officials may be unsure 
of whether they should engage in communications with interested 
parties, and residents and developers are unsure of whether they 
can approach city officials without jeopardizing their case. Thus, 
judicial reviewers of land use decisions that are challenged on the 
basis of an ex parte communication are faced with balancing the 
desirability of protecting the rights of the individual land owner 
against the desirability of promoting the efficiency of government 
by granting its officers sufficient room to carry out their public 
functions. 29 
Currently, state courts use three different standards of review in 
deciding whether an ex parte communication is basis for reversal. 
The standards are: the legislative/quasi-judicial distinction,30 the 
clear showing of bias standard,31 and the appearance of fairness 
26 [d. at 1157. This smaller scale land use dispute has become typical in local courts partly 
because of the "Quiet Revolution" in which state or regional boards have removed a number 
of large scale land projects from the purely local arena. [d. at 1156. See U.S. COUNCIL ON 
ENVTL. QUALITY, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971), cited in Rose, 
supra note 25, at 1156. 
27 Fasano Comment, supra note 1, at 102. This observation is also a natural extension of 
the fact that these are small, local disputes where the people involved often know or seek 
advice from local officials. 
28 For a discussion of the distinction between quasi-judicial and legislative decisions made 
by the same decisionmaking body see Sullivan, supra note 22, at 361. 
29 Recent Decisions, Public Hearings-An Appearance of Fairness, 5 GONZ. L. REV. 324, 
330 (1970). There is a present judicial trend favoring the rights of the individual. [d. This 
trend reflects less concern for efficiency of government. Maintaining the appropriate ex parte 
standard for legislative, administrative, and judical decisionmaking bodies would insure gov-
ernmental efficiency without jeopardizing individual rights. 
30 E.g., Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. at 62,217 A.2d at 582 (governmental 
bodies exercise executive, judicial, and legislative functions); Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs 
of Washington County, 264 Or. at 580, 507 P.2d at 26 (rigidly viewing all zoning decisions by 
local governing bodies as legislative would be ignoring reality); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 
81 Wash. 2d 292, 298, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972) (a zoning decision may be administrative or 
legislative depending upon the nature of the act). 
31 E.g., E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 116 Ill. App. 3d 586,607,451 N.E.2d 
555, 571 (1983) (complaining party must suffer prejudice); Neuberger v. City of Portland, 288 
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doctrine. 32 Courts applying the legislative/quasi-judicial distinction 
determine first whether a decision is legislative or quasi-judicial 
based on the nature of the decision and then apply one of two 
standards. 33 If legislative, the court grants the board considerable 
deference as to its decisionmaking process. 34 Passing an ordinance 
that lays down general policies without regard to specific property 
is an example of a legislative act. 35 Accordingly, the court will subject 
an ex parte communication to limited review and the decision will 
be overturned only for an arbitrary abuse of authority.36 If quasi-
judicial, the procedures must meet due process requirements that 
include an impartial tribunal free from pre-hearing or ex parte com-
munications. 37 An example of a quasi-judicial act is granting permis-
sion to change the use of a specific piece of property. 38 
The second standard of review disqualifies board members or 
legislators participating in ex parte communications only when there 
is a clear showing of bias and prejudice. 39 The appealing party has 
the burden of proving the decisionmaker's bias. 40 
The third standard of review requires not only that the hearing 
be free of actual bias, but that the ex parte communication not cause 
the proceedings to appear unfair to the general public. 41 Courts apply 
this standard, the appearance of fairness doctrine, to the legislative 
and quasi-judicial types of decisions. 42 
Or. 585, 590, 607 P.2d 722, 725 (1980) (issue is whether evidence shows that the tribunal or 
its members were biased). 
32 Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 733, 453 P.2d 832, 842 (1969) (a hearing must 
not only be fair but also appear to be fair to the public). 
33 See cases cited supra note 30. 
34 Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Washington County, 264 Or. at 580-81, 507 P.2d at 
26. 
351d. 
361d. 
371d. 
38 ld. 
39 See cases cited supra note 31. 
40 E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 116 Ill. App. 3d at 607,451 N.E.2d at 571 
(complaining party must show prejudice suffered from ex parte contacts). 
41 Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d at 733, 453 P.2d at 842. 
42 E.g., Kovalik v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n of New Fairfield, 155 Conn. 497, 499, 234 
A.2d 838, 839 (1967) (the administrative power to limit an individual's free use ofland demands 
the highest public confidence-whether the power is considered legislative or quasi-judicial); 
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d at 299-300,502 P.2d at 331 (the appearance of fairness 
doctrine is applied to hearings which amend existing codes or reclassify land); Smith v. Skagit 
County, 75 Wash. 2d at 733, 453 P.2d at 842 (public hearings must be undertaken in a genuine 
effort to ascertain the wiser legislative course to pursue and appear to be done for that 
purpose). 
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A. Legislative/Quasi-Judicial Distinction 
1. Case-By-Case Analysis 
Many state courts decide how to review questionable ex parte 
communications in land use decisions on a case-by-case basis.43 This 
case-by-case approach fails to establish overall standards for deci-
sionmakers as to whether or not they may communicate with inter-
ested parties outside of official hearings. The legislative/quasi-judi-
cial distinction for reviewing ex parte communication challenges is 
such a case-by-case analysis. This distinction is often so fact specific 
that it gives land use decisionmakers no notice of when a court might 
invalidate a decision because of ex parte communications. 44 
In applying this standard, courts determine first whether the land 
use board's decision has produced a general rule or policy that is 
applicable to a class of individuals, interests, or situations, or 
whether the decision involves application of a general rule or policy 
to a specific individual, interest, or situation. 45 The former consti-
tutes legislative action while the latter is adjudicatory in nature. 46 
In practice, the distinction is less clear.47 Courts have difficulty in 
applying the legislative/quasi-judicial standard consistently. For ex-
ample, in Smith v. Skagit County, the Supreme Court of Washington 
held that amending a land use ordinance to rezone 470 acres of a 
5,500 acre island previously wholly-zoned as residential-recreational 
so that an aluminum company could operate a plant on the island 
43 See cases cited supra note 30. 
44 Reviewing courts may differ in their interpretation of a land use decision. See, e.g., Arnel 
Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 98 Cal. App. 3d 567, 159 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (1979) (Court of 
Appeal said the action was adjudicatory), vacated, 28 Cal. 3d 5ll, 514, 620 P.2d 565, 566-67, 
169 Cal. Rptr. 904, 906 (1980) (supreme court said action was legislative); Glenn, State Law 
Limitations on the Use of Initiatives and Referenda in Connection with Zoning Amendments, 
51 S. CAL. L. REV. 265, 299-300 (1978) (the author states that the weakness of characterizing 
final decisions is that no court has defined the situations in which the analysis applies). 
45 Fasano v. Rd. of County Comm'rs of Washington County, 264 Or. at 581, 507 P.2d at 27. 
The court gives as an example of an exercise of legislative authority "the passage of the 
ordinance by the Washington County Commission in 1963 which provided for the formation 
of a planned residential classification to be located in or adjacent to any residential zone." An 
example of judicial authority was "the county commissioners' determination in this particular 
matter to change the classification of [aJ specific piece of property." Id. at 581, 507 P.2d at 26. 
46Id. at 581, 507 P.2d at 27. 
47 According to Chief Judge Prescott in Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, "[uJp to 
the present time, no one has been able to delineate, with precision and accuracy, an exact 
formula for determining the line of demarcation between the differences between legislative 
and judicial functions. These differences, on occasions, are particularly difficult of determi-
nation when mixed, blended, or combined functions are given, and exercised by the same 
official, board, or agency .... " 242 Md. at 62,217 A.2d at 583. 
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was legislative in nature. 48 In a similar case, however, the same 
court reached a different result. In Fleming v. City of Tacoma, the 
court held that granting a land use change from single family resi-
dences to multiple family developments was subject to quasi-judicial 
review standards. 49 The land developers wanted to construct con-
dominiums and the reclassification would have allowed construction 
of townhouses and retirement homes as well. 50 
Thus, two attempts by the same court to reclassify residential 
land for a more commercial use were subject to two different stan-
dards of review. The situation in Smith involved the application of 
a general zoning plan to a specific situation. Such an action is quasi-
judicial. Because the Skagit County Commissioners wanted to amend 
the plan, however, the court held the action legislative. 51 In Fleming, 
the City of Tacoma also wanted to change the current land use 
requirements. 52 However, the court said that amendment of a zoning 
code or reclassification of land was adjudicatory,53 even though the 
building of multi-family dwellings involved many individuals. The 
decisions are thus inconsistent. Inconsistent results such as these 
are a current problem in land use decisionmaking because of courts' 
uncertainty in dealing with ex parte communications. 
The distinction between decisions is important because when a 
state court concludes that a land use decision is legislative, the court 
does not require the decisionmaking body to adhere to technical rules 
of procedure and evidence during its proceedings. 54 The court pre-
sumes the land use decision is valid unless opponents can show that 
the land use board abused its authority arbitrarily. 55 In such cases, 
courts do not require the parties to put ex parte communications on 
the record. Furthermore, in instances where courts or statutes do 
not require zoning hearings to conform to fair trial standards, deci-
sionmakers engage in ex parte communications without restriction. 56 
48 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969). Although deemed legislative, the decision to rezone 
was overturned because it favored a particular individual and not the welfare of the community 
as a whole, and the ex parte communications complained of were said to violate the "test of 
fairness." Id. at 741-43, 453 P.2d at 847-48. 
49 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972). The court distinguished zoning amendment decisions 
from legislative hearings and held the ordinance invalid because of ex parte communications. 
Id. 
50 Id. 81 Wash. 2d at 293, 502 P.2d at 328. 
51 Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969). 
52 81 Wash. 2d at 293, 502 P.2d at 328. 
53 Id. at 298-300, 502 P.2d at 330--31. 
54 8A E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.251 (3d ed. 1986). 
55 Fasano v. Ed. of County Comm'rs of Washington County, 264 Or. at 581, 507 P.2d at 26. 
56 Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 
OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 141. 
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In contrast, if state courts determine that the land use decision is 
quasi-judicial, then due process requirements prevail57 and decision-
makers must refrain from ex parte communications or include them 
in the record so that interested parties may present evidence in 
rebuttal. 58 This legislative/quasi-judicial distinction requires the 
courts to overlook the forum and instead analyze the fact pattern of 
each case and the effect of the decision after it has been made. 59 For 
example, the court in Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Washington County held that judicial review of a zoning decision 
must start with a characterization of the nature of the decision. 60 
The court thus ignored the type of decisionmaking body. 
2. Legislative Presumption for Land Use Decisions 
Some courts adopt either the legislative or quasi-judicial charac-
terization of land use decisions and apply the corresponding standard 
when reviewing all land use decisions, instead of reviewing them on 
a case-by-case basis. 61 Many state courts as well as interested de-
velopers, neighbors, and board officials find that case-by-case anal-
ysis creates uncertainty and thus inefficiency in the development of 
land. This uncertainty prompts some courts to find that all zoning 
ordinances are legislative acts regardless of the individual circum-
stances. 62 These courts give great deference to the decisions of their 
land use boards. Thus they apply the high degree of deference 
accorded legislative acts to both large-scale, highly publicized local 
land use decisions involving many different interest groups, and the 
more numerous small-scale disputes, involving single parcels and 
named parties. 63 
If a court deems that a land use decision is legislative, the court 
reviews ex parte contacts only when there is a manifest abuse of 
57 See supra notes 37--39 and accompanying text. 
58 Comment, supra note 56, at 141-42. 
59 Glenn, supra note 44, at 295. 
60 264 Or. at 579, 507 P.2d at 25-26 (emphasis added). 
61 Rose, supra note 25, at 1157-64. 
62 E.g., Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d at 515, 620 P.2d at 566-67, 169 
Cal. Rptr. at 906 (a decision that some zoning ordinances are adjudicative would create 
confusion "which would require years of litigation to resolve"); City of Coral Gables v. Car-
michael, 256 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (enactment of the original zoning 
ordinance was legislative so any amendment to it is also legislative in character). 
63 Rose, supra note 25, at 1158-60. Congressional acts are often thought of as model 
legislative acts. Courts that review congressional acts can presume that Congress acted 
reasonably toward all interested parties because of the process of coalition-building and 
logrolling for votes. Id. at 1158 (citing the Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison)). 
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discretion involving arbitrary and capricious conduct. 64 The reason 
courts give deference to land use decisions that are characterized as 
legislative is that the legislative process is designed to be highly 
visible, have a broad-based impact, and be self-remedying at the 
polls.65 Thus, the legislative process needs less court intervention, 
because it responds to public concerns and not to conflicts between 
individual parties. Though courts do not generally review ex parte 
communications regarding a legislative decision, judges and com-
mentators have warned that the legislative model is inappropriate 
for small-scale land use disputes which attract little publicity and 
involve few interested parties. 66 Applying the legislative model in 
such circumstances leads to impropriety and thoughtless local deci-
sionmaking. 67 
Although the courts may treat land use decisions as legislative, 
court opinions do not give board members guidelines in order to 
make land use decisions as effective legislators.68 In the absence of 
adequate guidelines, board members do not know when courts will 
permit ex parte communications or when the communications will 
constitute grounds for vacating a land use decision. 69 As a result, 
the board members are not consistent in deciding whether to speak 
with people outside of a formal hearing. Therefore, local land use 
decisionmakers give the public the impression that land use decisions 
are susceptible to undue influence or outright corruption. 70 
Without proper guidelines and standards for local land use boards 
to follow, rights of individual property owners are often sacrificed 
when ex parte communications occur in small-scale land use disputes 
that involve few interested parties, little publicity, and limited ju-
dicial review. 71 Showing that allegedly improper ex parte communi-
cations motivated a board member will not enable an individual to 
challenge a land use decision unless that decision was arbitrary and 
capricious. 72 Moreover, high visibility or amenablity to elective rem-
64 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at § 3.14. 
65 See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955) ("For protection against 
abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts. "). 
66 Rose, supra note 25, at 1158. 
671d. 
68 See generally R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME, 156 (1969) (discussing attorney and 
taxpayer frustration when proceedings before boards and reviewing courts result in different 
decisions and eventually a remand to start all over again). 
69 Legislation could be used to prescribe rules regarding ex parte communications. ld. 
70 Rose, supra note 25, at 1158. 
71 See generally Comment, supra note 56, at 131-32. 
72 See generally Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d at 298, 502 P.2d at 331; 1 R. 
ANDERSON, supra note 9, at § 14.20. 
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edies does not protect land use decisions between individual land 
owners, even though ex parte communications are subject to the 
same legislative standard of review. 
3. Quasi-Judicial Presumption for Land Use Decisions 
Some state courts have differed from those discussed above by 
characterizing all land use decisions that involve individual parcels 
of land as quasi-judicial. 73 Under this approach, parties at a hearing 
before a county governing body are entitled to an opportunity to be 
heard, to have a record made of the evidence and findings, and to 
present and rebut evidence before an impartial tribunal. 74 An im-
partial tribunal is one that is completely free from pre-hearings or 
ex parte communications. 75 
Characterizing land use decisions as quasi-judicial instead of leg-
islative has attracted commentary.76 The American Law Institute's 
Model Land Development Code sets forth a quasi-judicial approach 
for administrative hearings77 as a possible solution to the present 
legislative standard that gives too much deference to land use actions 
73 E.g., Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 426, 542 P.2d 371, 375 (1975) (enactment 
of a rezoning ordinance pursuant to statutory criteria is a quasi-judicial function according to 
the modern trend in zoning law); cf. Margolis v. Dist. Court, 43 Colo. App. 480, 638 P.2d 297, 
303-04 (1981) (zoning decision is legislative for purposes of referendum and initiative provisions 
of Colorado Constitution); Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 597, 584 P.2d 130, 
135 (1978) (a proceeding is quasi-judicial where the focus is a specific tract of land requiring 
a weighing of evidence, a balancing of equities, an application of rules, regulations and 
ordinances to facts, and a resolution of specific issues); City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 
S.W.2d 173, 178 (Ky. 1971) (decisionmaking body is acting quasi-judicially when determining 
whether a "particular individual by reason of particular facts peculiar to his property" is 
entitled to some form of relief); West v. City of Portage, 392·Mich. 458, 468, 472, 221 N.W.2d 
303, 308, 310 (1974) (a zoning amendment affecting particular property is an administrative 
act; here it was rezoning 150 acres of land from single-family residential into sections allowing 
community business, multiple family, and office service). 
74 Fasano v. Ed. of County Comm'rs of Washington County, 264 Or. at 588, 507 P.2d at 30. 
The standard of review for quasi-judicial zoning decisions often involves conformance with the 
municipality's comprehensive plan. This reflects the court's position that the public interest 
is of primary importance. Fasano Comment, supra note 1, at 98-99. The plan is a general 
guideline to control and direct the use and development of property in a municipality. Nowicki 
v. Planning and Zoning Ed., 148 Conn. 492, 497, 172 A.2d 386, 389 (1961). Vagueness in a 
comprehensive plan complicates judicial review of zoning decisions because no genuine stan-
dards for individual decisions are provided. Rose, supra note 25, at 1162--63. 
7" Fasano v. Ed. of County Comm'rs of Washington County, 264 Or. at 588, 507 P.2d at 30. 
76 E.g., Comment, supra note 56. The author proposes that "the procedural safeguards and 
standards of judicial review applicable to judicial functions" are adequate to protect the 
interests affected by rezoning. Jd.; Rose, supra note 25, at 1160. 
77 MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-304 (1975). 
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that are administrative in nature. The quasi-judicial model provides 
courts with specific standards to apply when reviewing questions of 
adequate notice, testimony, evidence, and fair hearings according to 
traditional due process standards. 78 
For example, the Model Land Development Code requires indi-
vidual notice to the developer, owners of land within 500 feet of the 
proposed development, neighborhood organizations within 500 feet, 
and any other person, agency, or organization requesting notice. 79 
The notice must give the time and place of the hearing, describe the 
subject matter, and specify someone from whom interested parties 
may obtain additional information. 80 At the hearing all testimony 
must be under oath and the court must afford the parties an oppor-
tunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. 81 In addi-
tion, the land use board must make a full record of the hearing and 
make it available to the public on request. 82 Decisionmakers can 
protect their decisions from judicial invalidation by following these 
well-established standards of due process. 83 
The quasi-judicial characterization is not as clear regarding ex 
parte communications as it is regarding basic procedure. Legislation 
simply instructs decisionmakers that reviewing courts will not per-
mit ex parte communications unless included in the record. 84 
All three variations of the legislative/ quasi-judicial distinction-
case-by-case analysis, legislative presumption, and quasi-judicial 
presumption-look to the facts of the situation, not to the decision-
making body, to determine whether an ex parte communication is 
78 A. Sirois, supra note 6, at 16. 
79 MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-304. 
80 Id. 
81Id. 
82 Id. 
83 A. Sirois, supra note 6, at 16. 
84 
(9) A person who has been assigned to conduct a hearing or make a decision shall 
neither 
(a) communicate, directly or indirectly, with any party or his representatives in 
connection with any issue involved except upon notice and opportunity for all parties 
to participate; nor 
(b) use nor rely upon any communications, reports, staff memoranda, or other 
materials prepared in connection with the particular case unless made a part of the 
record; nor 
(c) inspect the site with any party or his representative unless all parties are 
given an opportunity to be present. 
MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-304 (9) (1975). 
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basis for reversal. This emphasis on facts instead of the type of 
decisionmaking body is flawed because sometimes courts give defer-
ence to actions that are administrative in nature. Due process rights 
to a fair hearing, and the standard of review for that hearing with 
regard to ex parte communications, are too fundamental to our legal 
system to be determined solely by a process of labeling one decision 
legislative and another quasi-judicial. 85 By using this distinction 
courts draw an arbitrary line that a litigant must cross in order to 
get ex parte communications reviewed under the quasi-judicial stan-
dards. 86 The difficulty arises when a borderline act affects just 
enough people or property for the court to deem the act legislative. 87 
Those affected are unable to bring their ex parte contentions to a 
court utilizing this legislative standard of review. For example, a 
court may treat a case of 842 acres owned by several dozen people 
legislatively,88 while 601 acres with 3 owners and 90 concerned own-
ers of adjoining property is treated quasi-judicially.89 Basing a review 
on specific facts does not allow uniformity in the treatment of ex 
parte communication appeals. 
Courts create uncertainty90 about the finality of land use decisions 
when they apply a standard of review based on the nature of a 
specific land use decision rather than applying consistently a stan-
dard based on the nature of the decisionmaking body. A decision-
based standard results in decisionmakers not knowing whether in a 
particular situation ex parte communications will form the basis for 
85 Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa: Rezoning by Initiative and Landowners' 
Due Process Rights, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1129 (1982) [hereinafter Arnel CommentJ. The 
United States Supreme Court does not use this characterization test to adjudicate due process 
claims. Instead the Court has utilized an approach which depends on "(1) a showing that a 
protected interest has been abridged by state action; and (2) the ... balancing [of] the size 
of the protected interest against the administrative costs involved in providing procedure 
safeguards." Id. citing Ed. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
86 Id. at 1129 n.132. The only threshold requirement under the Supreme Court balancing 
test is that a protected interest be shown. I d. 
871d. 
88 Joyce v. City of Portland, 24 Or. App. 689, 546 P.2d 1100 (1976) (since action of the city 
was legislative in nature it was not subject to judicial scrutiny in writ of review proceeding). 
89 Neuberger v. City of Portland, 37 Or. App. 13, 586 P.2d 351 (1978). A petition for 
rehearing was denied by the Oregon Supreme Court which also maintained that the decision 
was a quasi-judicial one but that there was no "mechanical" rule that any ex parte contact 
would render the decisionmakers unable to act in the matter. Neuberger v. City of Portland, 
288 Or. 585, 607 P.2d 722 (1980). 
90 It is important for private property owners to have a set of expectations on which they 
can act to exercise choices concerning land use. JOINT CENTER FOR URBAN STUDIES OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY AND HARVARD UNIVERSITY, LAW AND LAND 
33-34 (C. Haar ed. 1964) [hereinafter LAW AND LANDJ. 
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a court challenge, or whether the public will view the communica-
tions as appropriate to the legislative decisionmaking process. 91 
An essential purpose of land use regulation is to stabilize use of 
property.92 Owners of property have a right to rely on the fact that 
existing regulations will control the use of land. 93 Neighbors and 
developers are unwilling to invest in land when they are unsure how 
land use issues that directly affect property value will be handled. 94 
As long as courts continue to focus their review of questionable 
ex parte communications on the categorization of a board's final 
decision rather than on the nature of the board itself, the likelihood 
of courts applying different standards to similarly situated parties 
exists. Elected officials' decisions should be valid despite ex parte 
communications, absent evidence of conflict of interest or undue 
influence. Thus, courts should allow elected officials to make land 
use decisions in the political manner traditional to our legislative 
process. 
B. Clear Showing of Bias Standard 
When courts place ex parte communications on the record, two 
prevailing treatments of these communications occur. One requires 
91 When the legislative and quasi-judicial standards are blurred together the administrative 
decisionmaker is confused as to "whether receipt of a communication should be condemned by 
standards comparable to those applied to judicial proceedings, or commended as the diligent 
action of a legislator or executive officer seeking to inform himself fully in order that he may 
better serve the public." Peck, Regulation and Control of Ex Parte Communications with 
Administrative Agencies, 76 HARV. L. REV. 233, 235 (1962). 
Professor Peck suggests that the objective of federal agencies should be to set a standard 
of ethical not coercive behavior that will give the public confidence in administration. Id. at 
274. This objective is just as relevant in local land use situations, but the current decision-
based standards can not achieve the goal. 
92 Nowicki v. Planning and Zoning Bd., 148 Conn. at 496, 172 A.2d at 388. The comprensive 
plan is the basic tool for local land use planning. It is a general plan to control and direct the 
use and development of property in a municipality. Id.; see supra note 74. 
93 Nowicki v. Planning and Zoning Bd., 148 Conn. at 496, 172 A.2d at 389. In a specially 
concurring opinion for Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs of Washington County, Justice 
Bryson pointed out "the prohibitive cost and extended uncertainty to a homeowner when a 
governmental body decides to change or modify a zoning ordinance or comprehensive plan 
affecting such owner's real property." 264 Or. at 589-90, 507 P.2d at 30. He said that the 
controversy at hand had passed through six steps from the respondent's first opposition before 
the planning commission to the supreme court's final decision. Fasano happened to be an 
attorney, but "no average homeowner or small business enterprise [could] afford [such] a 
judicial process ... nor can a judicial system cope with or endure such a process in achieving 
justice." Justice Bryson claims that it is up to the legislative branch to devise statutory 
procedure to expedite finality of decisions. Id. 
94 For a good discussion on private property and planning see LAW AND LAND, supra note 
90, at 31-34. 
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a clear showing of actual bias and prejudice. 95 The other will allow 
a court to overturn a decision if an ex parte communication creates 
merely an appearance of unfairness. 96 
Oregon is one state that follows a clear showing of bias standard. 
For example, in Neuberger v. City of Portland, opponents of a 
rezoning argued on appeal that conversations and correspondence 
between the applicants and city representatives concerning a pos-
sible sale of property were improper ex parte communications. 97 The 
Supreme Court of Oregon held that the mere presence of ex parte 
communications would not render a decision void when the evidence 
did not show that the tribunal or its members were biased. 98 
In contrast, the State of Washington follows an appearance of 
fairness standard. In Smith v. Skagit County, the planning commis-
sion met with advocates of a rezoning during an executive session, 
but excluded the opponents. 99 The Washington Supreme Court did 
not even address the issue of bias because the decision had lost its 
appearance of fairness, and "appearances are quite as important as 
substance. "100 
Elected decisionmakers face a special problem when courts review 
their decisions for improper ex parte communications. The problem 
arises because the public expects elected officials to talk to their 
constituents and, as a result, candidates may campaign on the very 
issues they later decide as board members.101 An appealing party 
may point to instances where a board member spoke with a constit-
uent regarding the pending action in an attempt to show bias that 
resulted in an unfair hearing. This constituent contact may take 
many forms. For example, an interested party may ask a decision-
maker to disqualify him or herself from participation in a decision 
based on a response to an audience question at a candidate's night 
meeting that expressed opposition to a proposed land use issue. 102 
Interested parties may also raise questions of bias to void an action 
of the decisionmaking body when members have made campaign 
95 See cases cited supra note 31. 
96 See cases cited supra note 42. 
97 288 Or. at 590, 607 P.2d at 725. 
98Id. 
99 75 Wash. 2d at 742-43, 453 P.2d at 848. 
100 Id. at 733, 453 P.2d at 842. 
101 Rose, supra note 25, at 1164. 
102 City of Fairfield v. Superior Court of Solano County, 14 Cal. 3d at 772-73, 537 P.2d at 
377, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 545 (when the councilman did not withdraw and the council denied the 
party's request for a development permit, the party filed a complaint contending that bias 
had denied it a fair hearing; the court did not overturn the decision). 
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promises "loudly and frequently" to vote against a certain issue. 103 
Elected land use officials are torn between representing their con-
stituency effectively and preventing courts from reversing their de-
cisions due to bias. 
The land use situation becomes even more uncertain when courts 
treat the decisions of an elected land use board quasi-judicially. The 
quasi-judicial standard should prohibit all ex parte communica-
tions.104 Courts applying the quasi-judicial model to these situations, 
however, do not overturn the contested decisions on the grounds 
that a "crystallized point of view" is no ground for disqualification, 105 
and decisionmakers have an obligation to discuss issues with their 
constituents. 106 This approach is not in line with the quasi-judicial 
model where land use decisionmaking should emulate courtroom 
proceedings with disinterested judges. Thus, by allowing elected 
officials the freedom to campaign and represent their constituency, 
the quasi-judicial standard does not apply the courts' declared policy 
accurately, and the result is uncertainty. 
1. Considerations in Evaluating Ex Parte Communications Under 
the Clear Showing of Bias Standard 
The clear showing of bias standard is attractive when used in 
conjunction with the quasi-judicial or legislative standards because 
an ex parte communication does not render automatically the tri-
bunal, or its affected members, unable to act in that matter.107 In-
stead, courts engage in a weighing of all relevant factors. Courts 
consider whether the decisionmaking process was so tainted by the 
ex parte communication that the ultimate judgment was unfair to 
an innocent party or the public interest. 108 
103 Turf Valley Assocs. v. Zoning Ed., 262 Md. 632, 644, 278 A.2d 574,580 (1971) (the court 
did not overturn the board's decision because of the campaign promises). 
104 The board, when acting quasi-judicially, should model its procedures on those of a court. 
See Rose, supra note 25, at 1161. 
105 Turf Valley Assocs. v. Zoning Ed., 262 Md. at 644,278 A.2d at 580. 
106 City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d at 781, 537 P.2d at 382, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 
550 (city council in voting to deny permit application was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity). 
107 A court is not required to invalidate all land use decisions where ex parte communications 
are proven when the court applies a quasi-judicial standard. See Neuberger v. City of Portland, 
288 Or. App. at 590, 607 P.2d at 725. 
108 PATCO v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (allegations 
of impropriety arose during the Federal Labor Relations Authority's consideration of the air 
traffic controllers strike), cited in E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Ed., 116 Ill. App. 
3d at 606, 451 N.E.2d at 571. 
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Some courts that review land use decisions consider several factors 
to determine the significance of an ex parte communication. 109 When 
a court determines that an ex parte communication has been signif-
icant, it is basis for vacating the land use decision. One factor is the 
gravity of the communication. 110 Usually, courts consider improper 
an ex parte communication that tampers with the adjudicatory pro-
cess directly, such as a covert effort to influence a decisionmaking 
official. 111 A communication void of anything "savoring of corruption 
or attempt to corrupt, "112 however, will not lead courts to vacate an 
administrative decision. 113 Courts applying the clear showing of bias 
standard will not penalize a board member for making an uninten-
tional or accidental communication to an interested party. 
Two other factors that courts consider in deciding the significance 
of an ex parte communication are whether the communication influ-
enced the board's ultimate decision, and whether the party making 
the communication benefited from that decision. 114 Although it is 
impossible for judges to determine the precise influence of an ex 
parte communication, a change in an administrative board's decision 
after a communication between a board member and an interested 
party will raise the "spectre of a substantial influence. "115 By consid-
ering whether ex parte communications influenced a decision, courts 
regard communications that were improper, but did not affect the 
land use boards' final decision, as immaterial procedural defects. 116 
Allowing parties to benefit from intentionally influential contacts 
outside formal hearings would encourage ex parte communications. 
Courts must also be aware of benefiting the communicating party 
when rendering a decision. ll7 The party actually may have wanted 
109 State courts such as Illinois have adopted factors of review from federal court cases 
dealing with ex parte contacts. E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 116 Ill. App. 
3d at 606, 451 N.E.2d at 571. 
110 Id. quoting PATCO v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d at 564. 
111 WKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 296 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 841 (1961) (ex 
parte contacts within a federal agency action). 
112 United Air Lines v. CAB, 309 F.2d 238,241 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (communications to a federal 
agency had been placed in a public file that was available to petitioners). 
113 Id. 
114 E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 116 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 451 N.E.2d at 
571. 
115 United States Lines v. FMC, 584 F.2d 519, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In United States Lines 
v. FMC the agency was required to "adjudicate the rights of certain named parties to an 
exemption from the antitrust laws." Id. at 539-50. 
116 An ex parte communication may be ill-advised but not require the reversal of a board's 
decision. E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 116 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 451 N.E.2d 
at 571. 
117 See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 58 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 
(1977). 
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the decision vacated. In addition, the board will know the same 
information on remand and so an unbiased decision may not be 
possible. lIS 
The courts' consideration of whether a party has benefited by 
committing an ex parte communication is tied into a fourth consid-
eration of whether vacation of the land use decision and remand for 
new proceedings would serve a useful purpose.1I9 Other action may 
be more appropriate, especially if a court looks at the length of time 
between the making of the original hearing record on a particular 
land use problem, and the court's initiation of judicial review. When 
the membership of the original board has changed, remanding the 
case may be a more appropriate action than vacating the decision. 120 
In these two situations it is likely that the board has forgotten facts 
or the offender is no longer around. An inquiry into whether other 
proceedings or actions may be more appropriate devices to resolve 
land use decisions protects the local land use decisionmaking process 
from a needless backlog and loss of administrative integrity. 
Finally, the reviewing court will consider whether the opposing 
party knew the content of the ex parte communication, and whether 
the opposing party had an opportunity to respond. 121 Parties ap-
pearing before an administrative board may employ ex parte com-
munications to introduce new arguments in support of their position 
or respond to the opposition's arguments. 122 Local governments can-
118 Id. 
119 E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 116 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 451 N.E.2d at 
57l. 
120 See Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. FCC, 294 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (decision 
by FCC allocating television channels remanded to commission with new membership). 
121 E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 116 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 451 N.E.2d at 
57l. 
Courts do not require a direct showing of prejudice to the party's interests under the clear 
showing of bias standard although this element is tied into the factors that are considered. 
As with conflicts of interest, an ex parte communication that is entirely too remote to be 
considered as improperly influencing the decisionmakers' official judgement will not cause a 
decision to be vacated. See generally 2 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, § 11-2 (4th 
ed. 1979). Courts reviewing a bias contention are also concerned with majorities and whether 
the vote of a "tainted" member was necessary to the decision. 4 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 
54, at § 13.31b. This issue might be important in an ex parte communication situation, as a 
factor in the court's determining whether to overturn a board's decision. 
122 United States Lines v. FMC, 584 F.2d at 538. 
Ex parte communications that are not placed in the record will not establish a clear showing 
of bias if judicial review is limited to the board's record. See Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs 
of Washington County, 264 Or. at 588, 507 P.2d at 30. Since ex parte communications are by 
definition "off the record," some courts hold' a de novo hearing to prevent injustice. See 8A 
E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 54, at § 25.334. In many jurisdictions the court's scope of review 
is limited to the record of the board, see id., so a party concerned about an ex parte 
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not permit these secret ex parte communications without the loss of 
public faith in government regulation of land use. 123 
The clear showing of bias standard thus allows certain ex parte 
contacts to take place if the involved decisionmaker(s) can remain 
unbiased. 124 The clear showing of bias standard does not presume a 
conflict, but requires opponents to prove a conflict exists. 125 The 
model assumes administrators are of good conscience. Courts pred-
icate an analysis of a decisionmaker's bias or interest "upon a realistic 
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses. "126 For 
example, in Turf Valley Associates v. Zoning Board of Howard 
County, the Maryland Court of Appeals recognized that people who 
think about controversial issues necessarily have biases. 127 The court 
would not overturn the zoning board decision simply because two 
members had concluded that planned communities would not be good 
for Howard County and had campaigned for office on that issue. 128 
There was no bias involved, only "sincere political and philosophical 
views. "129 
The clear showing of bias standard allows board members and 
legislators to draw upon the technical expertise of other city officials 
or planning experts through informal meetings,130 to work effectively 
with their staff,131 and to consider citizens' opinions on campaign 
communication should get it placed on the record. However, some courts will admit evidence 
on judicial review that a party failed, without fault, to discover. Id. at § 25.335. 
123 Federal agencies are also concerned with the issue of public faith and system integrity. 
See WKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 296 F.2d at 382-83. 
124 The Wyoming Supreme Court has considered the issue of conflicts of interest and con-
cluded that an inability to make an independant decision should not be presumed simply 
because of a relationship between aboard member and an interested party. Case Notes, 
Conflict of Interest-Legal Interests vs. Relational Interests, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 349, 
357 (1980). 
125 Local decisionmakers are often not paid for their long, hard work so it is their interest 
in the community that motivates them. An interest in many aspects of the community does 
not necessarily entail a conflict of interest. See generally id. 
126 Alkire, Washington's Super-Zoning Commission, 14 GONZ. L. REV. 559, 584 (1979) 
quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). 
127 262 Md. at 644, 278 A.2d at 580 (quoting K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 12.01 (1959». 
128Id. 
129Id. at 646, 278 A.2d at 58l. 
130 Kahn, In Accordance with a Constitutional Plan: Procedural Due Process and Zoning 
Decisions, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1011, 1044 (1979). Communication is enhanced and more 
information received when informal meetings are held because there is no need for formal 
written reports or prepared testimony. Id. 
131 The Appearance of Fairness Doctrine: A Conflict in Values, 61 WASH. L. REV. 533, 567 
(1986) (proposing that personal staff be exempt from ex parte recording requirement unless 
that person has a role in the proceeding) [hereinafter Appearance Comment). 
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issues that will later come before the decisionmaking body.132 Tech-
nically, courts could consider each of these situations an ex parte 
communication, but the communication would not result in vacation 
under the clear showing of bias standard. . 
It is possible that an absolute prohibition of ex parte contacts 
would actually have a greater tendency to inhibit rather than pro-
mote reliability of the local decisionmaking process. 133 In some sit-
uations, such as decisions on adopting annexation ordinances, the 
land use board must consider the relevant planning goals and apply 
those general standards to the specific facts of the case before it. 134 
Prohibiting ex parte communications could prevent decisionmakers 
from discerning the broader issues involved. 135 The basic require-
ment is an impartial tribunal; ex parte communications are only one 
way in which a tribunal could compromise its impartiality. Prohib-
iting all ex parte communications may be more dangerous than the 
potential for bias. 136 
2. Strengths and Faults of the Clear Showing of Bias Standard 
The conflict resulting from dual roles for elected officials-repre-
sentative of the people versus quasi-judicial decisionmaker-can be 
detrimental to the land use decisionmaking process. Courts create 
this conflict by not permitting ex parte communications in situations 
where elected officials make quasi-judicial decisions, and by allowing 
ex parte communications in legislative-type decisions. 137 If elected 
officials are unsure whether contact with constituents will constitute 
132 See, e.g., Turf Valley Assoc. v. Zoning Board of Howard County, 262 Md. at 644, 278 
A.2d at 580 (complainants said that campaign promises were ex parte communications denying 
them a fair hearing); City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d at 780, 537 P.2d at 382, 
122 Cal. Rptr. at 550 (council members have an obligation to discuss issues with their con-
stituents). 
133 Petersen v. Mayor & Council of City of Klamath Falls, 279 Or. 249, 257 n.8, 566 P.2d 
1193, 1197 n.8 (1977) (dictum). 
134Id. at 257, 566 P.2d at 1197. 
135Id. at 257 n.8, 566 P.2d at 1197 n.8. 
136 Tierney v. Duris, 21 Or. App. 613, 629, 536 P.2d 435, 443 (1975). 
137 See Rose, supra note 25, at 1161 (the reviewing court can ask whether the decision met 
the model for a proper adjudication-even though the decisionmaking body is a group of 
elected politicians). 
Whether a particular land use board is elected or appointed varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. Since state courts do not consider whether a land use board is elected or appointed 
when reviewing ex parte communications, it is difficult to tell from the opinions which type 
of land use board is being affected. The main point is that two standards are being applied to 
one decisionmaking body and its members do not know which standard to follow when making 
a land use decision. 
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an improper ex parte communication, then people who are most in 
need of help may be denied access to their elected representatives. 138 
These people may not understand what a zoning change will mean 
to their property and may feel pressured by aggressive, outside 
development companies. Big money will always have influence over 
a community's economy. Furthermore, developers present most de-
velopment proposals, such as shopping centers, as beneficial to the 
community. Many times such developments are beneficial, but either 
way, it is only fair that private individuals and neighborhood groups 
be able to express their opinions to their elected representatives 
regarding land use planning. 139 Even if the local elected government 
process accomplishes little more than giving citizens a forum to voice 
their opinions, it is still a worthwhile process. 
At the same time, when ex parte communications transmit critical 
facts, the reviewing court is unaware of the decisionmaker's actual 
reasons for its ruling. This hampers effective judicial review. 140 Land 
use decisions that courts find to be unfair as a result of ex parte 
communications also violate statutory and due process requirements 
for public hearings, and further undermine the integrity of the land 
use system.141 Some ex parte communications, however, are bound 
to take place, especially in small communities. Such communications 
do not necessarily make the board's decision unfair. The clear show-
ing of bias standard does not require the reversal of an otherwise 
fair land use decision when insignificant ex parte communications 
are present. 
Elected decisionmakers will carryon ex parte communications 
even if they do not have guiding standards of behavior. These com-
munications occur because legislators have an affirmative duty to 
consider the concerns of constituents. 142 Unfairness is more likely to 
result where a conflict arises between the elected representative role 
and the quasi-judicial role. 143 The clear showing of bias standard 
138 The legislative process requires thorough knowledge of the situation, an ability to devise 
practical means for remedying the situation, and the skill to draft a rule stating the remedy 
in an understandable manner. H. READ, supra note 13, at 2. 
139 See Tierney v. Duris, 21 Or. App. at 627-29, 536 P.2d at 442-43 (court held that 
communications, where council members talked to constituents about a proposed shopping 
facility, were insufficient to establish a lack of impartiality). 
140 PATCO v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d at 564 n.32 (considering the effect of 
ex parte communications on availability of meaningful judicial review). 
141 E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 116 Ill. App. 3d at 606, 451 N.E.2d at 
571. 
142 Appearance Comment, supra note 131, at 556. 
143 An elected public official has a duty to consider the concerns of constituents but as a 
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helps alleviate this danger of unfairness by permitting some ex parte 
communications in decisions free of bias, even if the court deems the 
land use decision quasi-judicial. 144 
For all its strengths, the clear showing of bias standard has some 
faults. Courts applying the clear showing of bias standard do not 
give decisionmakers usable standards as to when and where they 
will permit ex parte communications. Court opinions that are by 
nature fact specific do not establish general rules. Instead, courts 
merely rule on whether or not the land use board was biased in each 
particular situation. 145 Reviewing courts make statements such as 
the petitioner's arguments were "unpersuasive,"146 or that 
"[pJrejudgment of adjudicative facts is not necessarily a ground for 
disqualification."147 Uncertainty does not give board members a rea-
son to avoid ex parte situations. Specific guidelines would, however, 
promote useful dialogue between elected officials and constituents, 
and would restrict communications between interested parties and 
appointed officials. 
In addition, the requirement that a court base its review solely 
on the board's record may become burdensome. 148 A board would 
find it difficult to admit all ex parte communications into the rec-
ord,149 especially in small communities where social contact is fre-
quent. Thus, a court's traditional reliance on the record creates an 
incentive for the decisionmakers to include a great deal of extraneous 
material in the record. 150 This excess information slows the decision-
quasi-judicial decisionmaker every discussion with a constituent is possibly an improper ex 
parte communication. [d. 
144 E.g., Neuberger v. City of Portland, 288 Or. at 590, 607 P.2d at 725 (an ex parte 
communication touching on a matter before a board acting quasi-judicially will not render its 
members unable to act if they were not biased). 
145 See, e.g., E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 116 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 451 
N.E.2d at 571 (ex parte contacts were improper and ill-advised but the question is whether 
they require reversal in this situation); Neuberger v. City of Portland, 288 Or. at 590, 607 
P.2d at 725 ("The issue is not whether there were any ex parte contacts, but whether the 
evidence shows that the tribunal or its members were biased. In this case it does not. "). 
146 Neuberger v. City of Portland, 37 Or. App. at 25, 586 P.2d at 358 (negotiations between 
applicant and city for city's purchase of different parcel from one zoned, and participation by 
applicant's attorney in preparation of city council's findings after council had announced its 
decision). 
147 Turf Valley Associates v. Zoning Bd. of Howard County, 262 Md. at 645, 278 A.2d at 
580 (emphasis added) (openly expressed interest of two board members in removing planned 
communities from the area) (quoting K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.06). 
148 Peck, supra note 91, at 266-67. 
149 The expense and time outweigh any enhancement of the ideal of pure, untainted justice 
by the vacation of every proceeding in which an ex parte communication is made. [d. 
150 Where there is a general provision for opportunity to rebut summaries of ex parte 
communications, much testimony is taken on the collateral issue of accuracy. [d. at 267-68. 
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making process and creates additional recording expenses. High 
deference to the land use body's decision and court reliance on the 
record create a situation where evidence not placed on the record is 
lost for judicial review. 151 A court may consider independent evi-
dence, however, when an aggrieved party raises questions concern-
ing a decision's integrity, especially when the board's record is in-
complete. 152 If an ex parte communication is not on the record, then 
an appealing party cannot argue the issue during an appeal based 
on the record, even if the communication biased the decisionmaking 
body. 153 
The clear showing of bias requirement is a much more realistic 
approach to the fact that ex parte communication is bound to occur 
and may even be beneficial. This approach is especially important if 
courts continue to view elected officials as adjudicators for whom ex 
parte communications are usually prohibited. Unfortunately, this 
standard has the same inherent weakness as the legislative/quasi-
judicial distinction; it reviews ex parte communications by an ill-
defined, subjective standard long after the communications have 
taken place. For example, a court may not even review an ex parte 
communication if the communication was not admitted to the record 
during formal proceedings. Statutorily-enacted guidelines of accept-
able behavior for land use decisionmakers would be more beneficial 
to a board member than the murky standard of "bias" hovering over 
every communication. 
Courts should not permit appointed officials, as opposed to elected 
officials, to engage in ex parte communications. For appointed offi-
cials, the clear showing of bias standard may not be sufficiently strict 
151 See S. REIGEL & P. OWEN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THE LAW OF GOVERNMENT AGEN-
CIES § 5.2.1 (1982). 
152 Searles v. Darling, 46 Del. 263, 83 A.2d 96 (1951) (the board's record contained no basis 
for review so the only thing the Superior Court could do was hear evidence); 8A MCQUILLIN, 
supra note 54, at § 25.335. 
153 In contrast, the inability to question ex parte communications on appeal does not exist 
where courts review land use decisions de novo. De novo review assures that a court will 
determine if the merits of the case substantiate the decision regardless of deficiencies in the 
record. See Planning Bd. of Springfield v. Bd. of Appeals of Springfield, 355 Mass. 460, 245 
N.E.2d 454 (1969). In Massachusetts judges have a duty to determine the facts for themselves 
upon evidentiary introduction at trial, to apply governing principles of law and to inspect the 
board's decisions and enter a decree according to the dictates of justice and equity. [d. 
The issue of de novo review is a delicate one because many people disdain an activist 
judiciary and feel that local decisionmakers are better able to understand and make the best 
decision on local issues. Thus, a court will not have the power to determine whether an act 
was wise or foolish, or question its ultimate effect on the public good. Davidson County v. 
Rogers, 184 Tenn. 327, 198 S.W.2d 812 (1947). 
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since these officials apply specific statutory regulations and have no 
constituents. An appearance of fairness standard, therefore, would 
be more appropriate for appointed officials. 
C. Appearance of Fairness Doctrine 
Under the appearance of fairness doctrine, a court can invalidate 
a land use decision under any fact pattern involving ex parte com-
munications that casts an aura of improper influence, partiality, and 
prejudgment over the proceedings. 154 Not only must local boards' 
land use hearings remain free of actual interest, bias, or unfairness, 
but the general public must also perceive that the board undertook 
the hearing in a fair manner. 155 
A perception of unfairness, for example, could result when an 
attorney, who is also a board member, carries on negotiations and 
other business transactions for a client who has an interest in a 
board's decision. A court may overturn the board's decision even 
though the attorney disqualified himself from taking part in the 
decision. 156 In fact, the showing of any interest which may have 
influenced an official suffices to invalidate a land use decision. 157 An 
ex parte communication is the most obvious wayan official can 
manifest a possible interest to the general public. Although if no one 
observes the communication, the public will be unaware that it has 
taken place since it is by nature off the record. 
Ideally, courts that use the appearance of fairness doctrine at-
tempt to maintain public confidence in their appointed and elected 
officials who decide how individuals can use their land within the 
interests of the whole community.158 The test of public perception 
considers whether a reasonably prudent and disinterested observer 
154 See, e.g., Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745, 747-48, 337 A.2d 858, 859-60 (1975) 
(same solicitor represented the zoning board and the township, no actual prejudice but sus-
ceptible to prejudice and therefore prohibited); Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d at 742-
43, 453 P.2d at 848 (after close of public hearing, commission went into executive session but 
heard proponents, and opponents were not given opportunity to present views); "[Fjactors in 
the zoning process more indefinite than the clear showing of bias can invalidate the zoning 
procedure .... " Hillis, Land Use Planning in Washington: Overdue for Improvement, 10 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 320, 327 (1974). 
155 Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d at 741, 454 P.2d at 847. 
156 Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 866-67, 480 P.2d 489, 494-95 (1971). 
157 Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 523, 495 P.2d 1358, 1361-62 (1972). 
158 Appearance Comment, supra note 131, at 533. Members of land use decisionmaking 
bodies must be open-minded, objective, impartial, free of entangling influences, and capable 
of "hearing the weak voices as well as the strong." Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 
at 523, 495 P.2d at 1361. 
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would conclude that all parties obtained a fair and impartial hear-
ing. 159 The appearance of fairness doctrine does not depend on 
whether the decisionmaking board is elected or appointed. 160 In-
stead, courts subject any municipal body considering a land use issue 
to an appearance of fairness consideration. 
Like the legislative/quasi-judicial distinction and the clear showing 
of bias standard, the appearance of fairness doctrine is ill-defined 
and difficult to assess. 161 Courts make statements such as "the hear-
ing must be so conducted as to demonstrate that the relevant opin-
ions of all persons invited to attend will be considered and 
weighed,"162 and the minds of board members cannot be, nor appear 
to be, "foreclosed to reason and persuasion. "163 In addition, it is 
difficult for a court to determine when the doctrine applies. The 
Washington Supreme Court created the appearance of fairness doc-
trine to maintain public confidence in the governmental decision-
making process. 164 Washington courts apply this doctrine only to 
proceedings which they label quasi-judicial. 165 Yet, courts and deci-
sionmakers lack a clear definition of the term "quasi-judicial" and 
thus there is confusion as to when the appearance of fairness doctrine 
applies. 166 
The appearance of fairness doctrine is built on general terminology 
and keyed to superficial external impressions. 167 It is, therefore, not 
an appropriate way to deal with ex parte communications. The stan-
dard places emphasis on appearances and not on the merits of the 
case. 168 Furthermore, application of this doctrine overlooks the po-
159 Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d at 741, 453 P.2d at 847. "It is the possible range 
of mental impressions made upon the public's mind, rather that the intent of the acting 
governmental employee that matters." Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348,361, 552 P.2d 
175, 183 (1976). 
160 Appearance Comment, supra note 131, at 534. 
161 Vache, Appearance of Fairness: Doctrine or Delusion?, 13 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 479 
(1977). 
162 E.g., Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d at 742,453 P.2d at 847. 
163 Belsinger v. Dist. of Columbia, 295 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D. D.C. 1969). 
164 Appearance Comment, supra note 131, at 533. 
165 [d. at 534. 
166 [d. 
167 Recent Decisions, supra note 29, at 329. This article likens the requirement of an 
appearance of fairness to the high duty of care required of a trustee. That standard, it says, 
is much stricter than "the morals of the market place." An appearance of fairness is also 
compared to the ethical requirements of a judge---conduct free from impropriety, and the 
"appearance" of being free from impropriety. [d. at 329--30. 
168 See generally Zoning Amendments and the Doctrine of Apparent Fairness, 10 WILLA-
METTE L. REV. 348, 351 (1974) (the doctrine of apparent fairness is a departure from a 
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tential benefits of allowing persons to communicate expert opinions 
and expressions of community concern freely to a decisionmaker. 
Unlike the clear showing of bias standard, an informal meeting with 
other city officials or technical experts could create an appearance 
that a decision was unfair. 169 A concerned citizen, not party to a 
hearing, could not express an opinion to a land use decisionmaker, 
whether appointed or elected, without casting a shadow over a de-
cision's appearance of fairness. Moreover, the court makes no inquiry 
into the effect of these communications. 17o 
In addition, many localities have part-time land use boards whose 
members must carryon other income-producing occupations. Hold-
ing these people to an appearance of fairness standard will discour-
age professionals from holding such positions. A similar problem 
arises under conflict of interest law. For example, in Coyne, Swan 
& Renner v. Wyoming ex rel. Thomas,171 a conflict arose because 
several of the school district's trustees were married to teachers in 
the district.172 Just because a public officer is related to someone, 
however, does not mean necessarily that he or she is incapable of 
making an unbiased decision even though it may not appear to be 
fair.173 It is important not to discourage sincere, interested people 
from serving their communities. It is also important not to ignore 
the value of people with expertise holding land use decisionmaking 
positions. 
Those courts that employ the appearance of fairness standard 
place great importance on whether people perceive the "system" as 
fair.174 For example, in Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, the Wash-
consideration of the proceedings per se and a look at motives of the decisionmaking board 
instead) [hereinafter Apparent Fairness Comment]. 
169 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text. 
170 Buell v. Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d at 523, 495 P.2d at 1361-62 (no need to show that an 
interest actually influenced the decisionmaker). 
171 595 P.2d 970, 971 (Wyo. 1979). 
172Id. 
173 Case Notes, supra note 124, at 361. 
174 The courts are attempting to "uphold fairness and ward off unfair play in public hearings." 
Recent Decisions, supra note 29, at 330. However, this over-emphasis of appearances may 
have the opposite effect. In a system where every ex parte communication is grounds for 
vacating a land use decision, an unscrupulous party can cause such a communication to be 
made, thereby assuring vacation of a decision that he feels will go against him. Peck, supra 
note 91, at 266. A dependence on appearances will also upset otherwise carefully considered 
decisions that are blemished by a mere appearance of unfairness. See Chrobuck v. Snohomish 
County, 78 Wash. 2d at 874,480 P.2d at 498 (Hill, J., dissenting) (the court overturned a local 
planning decision which accorded with the original zoning plan and which was reached after 
seven months of deliberations and special hearings). 
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ington Supreme Court held that the "evil" to be remedied was not 
only the elimination of actual bias, prejudice, or favoritism, but also 
the prevention of situations that create suspicion and generate mis-
interpretation. 175 No matter how innocent a circumstance actually 
might be, a court must scrutinize the situation with care when 
appearances might undermine confidence in the exercise of zoning 
power. 176 
Many courts recognize implicitly that elected and appointed local 
decisionmakers possess considerable knowledge of community issues 
and thus deserve some judicial deference because of that knowl-
edge.177 The appearance of fairness standard ignores the value of 
such knowledge. Further, this standard allows a court to examine 
the decisionmaker's background, social contacts, and state of mind, 178 
thus threatening the decisionmaker's ability to form an independent 
opinion. Yet, in the final analysis, the court's decision depends on 
the judge's perception of whether the public thought the board made 
its decision in a fair manner. As Judge Hill said in his dissent to 
Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, "[T]he 'appearances' can only be 
gleaned from each judge's personal interpretation of how things 
would look to the public if all members of the public thought as he 
did. That is a subjective and personal, not a legal, standard."179 
In contrast, the clear showing of bias standard presumes that a 
decisionmaker can disregard indirect but potentially prejudicial com-
munications. 18o The appearance of fairness doctrine reverses this 
presumption and instead expands the scope of review. Yet the ap-
pearance of fairness doctrine fails to give board members guidelines 
to follow so that courts will not overrule their carefully considered 
opinions. 181 Moreover, an appearance of fairness challenge is very 
difficult to overcome once it has been raised. Courts overturn deci-
sions where the interested board member refrained from voting182 
and where the interested board member voted against his own self-
175 78 Wash. 2d at 867-68, 480 P.2d at 495. 
176 [d. 
l77 Judicial deference to the decisions of local decisionmakers prevents burdening the courts 
with litigation that does not increase administrative efficiency. The evils that may exist as a 
result of mistakes or errors of judgment are outweighed by the mischief and inconvenience of 
judicial supervision. 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 5.15 (1986). 
178 Vache, supra note 161, at 496. 
179 78 Wash. 2d at 877,480 P.2d at 500 (Hill, J., dissenting). "It requires no legal expertise 
to know that appearances are often misleading .... " [d. at 875, 480 P.2d at 499. 
180 See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. 
181 Vache, supra note 161, at 496. 
182 Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d at 525, 495 P.2d at 1362. 
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interest. l83 Such courts find that the self-interest of one member of 
the decisionmaking body "infects" the action of the other members, 
regardless of their disinterestedness. 184 Therefore, courts will inval-
idate a decision that appears to be unfair even though the tainted 
member abstains from voting, or the vote was unnecessary for pas-
sage of the decision. 185 
More importantly, the appearance of fairness doctrine is not ap-
propriate for elected officials. The application of the doctrine ham-
pers the electoral process and undermines the representative gov-
ernment's effectiveness. 186 People need to inform their elected board 
members about public concerns and opinions in order for officials to 
better serve their constituency.187 The free flow of information re-
garding potential effects of land use decisions and the viewpoints of 
all interested parties, achieved through ex parte communications, 
assist in the formulation of general principles. The appearance of 
fairness doctrine hinders citizens running for office if every contact 
with constituents who appear before the board is subject to scrutiny, 
and if campaign promises can later overturn an otherwise valid 
decision. 188 Frustrating legislators in this manner may force them 
"underground" to meet with their constituents covertly in order to 
represent them effectively. This will encourage corruption and ulti-
mately decrease public confidence in the land use process. 
In contrast, appointed officials have no constituents to serve and 
no campaigning to do. They too are chosen because of their views 
and capabilities. 189 Appointed officials' work involves applying estab-
lished rules or standards to specific facts.190 They have limited dis-
cretion because, unlike legislatures, they do not possess the power 
to evolve and modify rules to suit particular situations. 191 At the 
same time many appointed officials have authority to grant or deny 
land use requests. 192 Therefore, courts should hold appointed land 
183 Hochberg v. Borough of Freehold, 40 N.J. Super. 276, 283, 123 A.2d 46, 49 (1956). 
184 E.g., id.; Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d at 525,495 P.2d at 1362. 
185 Apparent Fairness Comment, supra note 168, at 349. 
186 Appearance Comment, supra note 131, at 558. 
187 See supra notes 101-03. 
188 See City of Fairfield v. Superior Court of Solano County, 14 Cal. 3d at 780-82, 537 P.2d 
at 382-83, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 550-52; see also Moskow v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 349 
Mass. 553, 210 N.E.2d 699 (1965). The court in Moskow refused to disqualify city council 
members who had expressed opinions or taken sides on the merits of a land use question. I d. 
189 Strauss, Disqualifications of Decisional Officials in Rulemaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 
990, 1027 (1980). 
190 8A E. McQUILLIN, supra note 54, at § 25.238. 
191Id. 
192 I d. at § 25.232. 
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use board members to the same standard regarding ex parte com-
munications as judges. 193 The difficulty is that, unlike most judges, 
many board members do not understand the idea of judicial 
impartiality194-especially the restricting of one's consideration in 
making a determination to "facts" within the scope of review. 195 The 
appearance of fairness doctrine may be too strict a standard for 
appointed land use board members given their lack of training and 
skills in comparison to that of judges. Nonetheless, it is more appli-
cable to appointed administrators than to elected officials. It would 
be easier for appointed board members to comply with the appear-
ance of fairness standard if given specific guidelines before courts 
expect them to act and think like judges. 
Generally a court applying the appearance of fairness doctrine, 
when reviewing a land use decision challenged on the basis of alleged 
ex parte communications, will grant very little deference to a deci-
sionmaking body's conclusion. 196 Under the appearance of fair:ness 
standard, an appellant need only show that a communication ap-
peared to influence a board member, and not that actual bias ex-
isted. 197 Under this standard a single act or set of circumstances that 
casts suspicion on the proceedings can thus be as damaging as de-
ciding a land use question without considering properly the merits 
of the case. Although increasing public confidence in the local land 
use decisionmaking process is a legitimate judicial interest,198 the 
appearance of fairness standard is too strict to allow the proper 
functioning of a representative elected body. The standard is, how-
ever, probably the best measure for appointed officials. 
193 Due process requires that "adjudicators must not be prejudiced by conditions so destruc-
tive of their impartiality as to prevent a fair hearing." Merrill, supra note 18, at 796-97. 
194 "In too many municipalities the local tribunal looks upon itself as an advocate for a point 
of view." R. BABCOCK, supra note 68, at 154. 
195 Richard Babcock noted in The Zoning Game that "in zoning the layman is vested with 
the heady power of direct participation in decision-making ... [and] [m]uch of the shouting 
by local decision-makers is phrased in economic terms .... " Id. at 30. Twenty years later, 
in The Zoning Game Revisited, Mr. Babcock states that "localisms, fiscal appetites, and 
zenophobia remain pervasive" in land use issues. R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING 
GAME REVISITED 1 (1986). Although considering the economic interests and sociological make-
up of a community may arguably be within the concerns of local legislators, the scope of 
inquiry of administrative board members is limited to facts specific to the particular land use 
question before the board. 
196 See Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d at 300, 502 P.2d at 331-32 (trial judge 
believed that the ex parte communication did not influence the decision, but held the ordinance 
invalid even though the involved councilman's vote was unnecessary for passage; supreme 
court affirmed). 
197 Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d at 361, 552 P.2d at 183. 
198 Kahn, supra note 130, at 1026-27. 
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IV. PROPOSED STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR Ex PARTE 
COMMUNICATIONS IN LOCAL LAND USE DECISIONS 
211 
The ex parte communication issue involves balancing the individ-
ual property owner's rights against the desirability of promoting 
government efficiency by granting its officers sufficient discretion to 
carry out their public functions. 199 California provides a good ex-
ample of a state court struggling with the ex parte communication 
issue. Traditionally, California courts considered measures that 
zoned or rezoned property to be legislative with no distinction as to 
the size of the area or the number of owners.200 A California court 
would not set aside decisions of the land use authorities as to matters 
of opinion and policy unless the facts showed that there had been an 
unreasonable, oppressive, or unwarranted interference with prop-
erty rights. 201 As a result, ex parte communications were almost 
unreviewable. 
Then the California courts began to distinguish decisions involving 
individual parcels of land as adjudicative. 202 An adjudicative classi-
fication meant that courts could review ex parte communications and 
possibly reverse a board's decision since the board had to comply 
with adjudicatory standards. 203 Most recently, the Supreme Court 
of California reiterated the traditional rule that land use ordinances 
are legislative,204 with one twist: variances, use permits, subdivision 
maps, and similar proceedings are adjudicative even when they in-
volve a substantial area or affect the community as a whole.205 In 
this manner California has attempted to impose economy and cer-
tainty in the land use law treatment of ex parte communications. 
Under the California example, decisionmakers have some guide-
lines for when to avoid ex parte communications, such as when 
199 Recent Decisions, supra note 29, at 330. 
200 E.g., Toso v. City of St. Barbara, 101 Cal. App. 3d 934,162 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1980); Ensign 
Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977); Hilton 
v. Bd. of Supervisors, 7 Cal. App. 3d 708, 86 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1970); Lockard v. City of Los 
Angeles, 33 Cal. 3d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949). 
201 Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 474, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 
308. 
202 E.g., Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718 
(1979); Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council, 44 Cal. App. 3d 825, 118 Cal. 
Rptr. 856 (1975). 
203 Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d at 612-13, 596 P.2d at 721-22, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 
596 (persons affected by quasi-judicial land use decisions are entitled to notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard). 
204 Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 
(1979). 
205 [d. at 518-19, 620 P.2d at 596, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 908. 
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deciding variances, use permits, subdivision maps, and like matters. 
This line-drawing does not take into account, however, the nature 
of the decisionmaker, that is, elected or appointed. Allowing the 
traditional decisionmaking models to work as they were intended 
would be a more effective way to balance property interests against 
government efficiency, instead of creating conflicting standards 
within the legislative and administrative models. When determining 
if an ex parte communication is basis for vacation, judicial reviewers 
should look at whether the decisionmakers were elected or ap-
pointed, rather than classify decisionmakers' final decisions as leg-
islative or quasi-judicial. 
Initially, however, courts must establish a workable definition of 
ex parte. In the strictest sense, ex parte communications may in-
clude communications with other government entities.206 Courts, 
therefore, need to define ex parte in terms of what it is and what it 
is not. Ex parte is not communication between decisionmakers and 
their staff, although courts must place investigatory reports by the 
staff member into the record. 207 Elected and appointed administra-
tors both need assistance in carrying out their duties. Courts should 
also not classify as ex parte visits to the site around which the land 
use decision centers. 208 Board members can conduct these visits in a 
professional, investigatory manner that will allow for a more in-
formed decision. The ex parte definition should also not include 
communications with other government entities.209 Local govern-
ments need unity and a sharing of technical expertise that persons 
can communicate without infringing on the rights of the involved 
parties. 
Ex parte communications are communications with any party ap-
pearing before the board when the hearing is not in session. In 
addition, any communications with interested, or even relatively 
disinterested, members of the community are also ex parte com-
munications. These communications may take place at parties, meet-
ings, work, or within a family setting. 
206 Kahn, supra note 130, at 1044. 
207 Appearance Comment, supra note 131, at 567. For example, see Oregon Revised Statute 
§ 215.422(4) "A communication between county staff and the planning commission or governing 
body shall not be considered an ex parte contact .... " OR. REV. STAT. § 215.422(4) (1985). 
208 Kahn, supra note 130, at 1044. See also Tierney v. Duris, 21 Or. App. at 629, 536 P.2d 
at 443 (no violation of impartiality requirement when the contacts only amounted to an 
investigation of the merits or demerits of a proposed change). 
209 See generally Peck, supra note 91, at 245 (the free flow of information assists in the 
formulation of general principles in other forums). 
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The term ex parte need not carry a negative connotation. If the 
members of a land use board are appointed, they should refrain from 
ex parte communications. State enabling acts and other land use 
statutes do not require communication with interested parties for 
application of their provisions to specific situations. 2lO Administrative 
decisionmakers can still keep the public interest in mind when de-
veloping rules and regulations to facilitate their specialized area 
without engaging in ex parte communications. 
States have administrative procedure acts that outline require-
ments for administrative boards. 211 The requirements usually include 
an impartial hearing examiner, an opportunity to present oral as 
well as written evidence, an opportunity to present rebuttal evi-
dence, and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. 212 States also 
have statutory guidelines for conflicts and ethical questions. 213 Fur-
thermore, many zoning enabling acts include regulation of notice, 
record, hearing procedures, and appeals. 214 These statutes need to 
add a provision defining ex parte communication and stating that 
appointed land use officials must refrain from communicating with 
any interested party. 215 
Since the public cannot vote appointed land use officials out of 
office, appointed officials' decisions should be subject to a de novo 
judicial review. 216 Under de novo review aggrieved parties may chal-
210 A reading of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act indicates that the duties of board 
members are limited to rendering a decision based on facts presented before the board. See 
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT §§ 1-9 (1926), reprinted in 4 R. ANDERSON, supra 
note 9, at § 30.01. 
211 E.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 30A (1984) (State Administrative Procedure); CAL. GOV'T CODE 
§ 11370 (West 1980) (Administrative Law and Procedure). 
212 E.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 30A (1984) (Adjudicatory Proceedings; Conduct of Proceedings); 
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11507.7, 11510-11514 (West 1980) (Administrative Adjudication). 
213 E.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 268A (1984) (Conduct of Public Officials and Employees); CAL. 
GOV'T CODE §§8920-8922 (West 1980) (Code of Ethics). 
214 E.g., MASS. GEN. L. chs. 40A:5, 40A:8, 40A:11, 40A:17 (1984) (Zoning); CAL. GOV'T 
CODE §§ 65351-65356.1, 65500-65507 (West 1980) (Planning and Land Use); STANDARD STATE 
ZONING ENABLING ACT (1926). 
215 For example, OR. REV. STAT. § 215.422(3) (1985) provides that 
[n]o decision or action of a planning commission or county governing body shall be 
invalid due to ex parte contact or bias ... if the member of the decisionmaking body 
receiving the contact: (a) Places [the communication] on the record ... ; and (b) Has 
a public announcement of the content of the communication and of the parties' right 
to rebut .... 
This type of statute provides a manner in which land use decisionmakers can protect their 
decisions from invalidation because of an ex parte communication but does not define ex parte 
nor make a distinction between elected and appointed land use officials. 
216 This position represents a departure of the generally held principle ~hat a court may not 
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lenge ex parte communications that are not part of the record. A 
more adequate record and findings resulting from such a review 
would also encourage more impartial, well considered decisions be-
cause of possible accountability.217 Courts applying an appearance of 
fairness standard in this situation would promote public confidence 
in appointed land use decisionmakers and their decisions. 
In contrast, if the members of a land use decisionmaking body are 
elected, then courts must allow them to act as legislators. The job 
of elected representatives is to represent the people who voted them 
into office.218 Local politicians should be accessible and responsive to 
local sentiment to an even greater degree than congressional officials 
be~ause local politicians do not have to consider national impact. Ex 
parte communication is one way for local land use officials to discover 
what their voters want. Knowing what voters want allows local 
elected officials to make land use decisions within the best interests 
of the community. 
State statutes already set out regulations prohibiting fraud, crim-
inal activity, and conflicts of interest.219 In addition, personal ethics 
and the electoral process itself will regulate elected land use officials. 
If the public views an elected decisionmaker as unfair or not repre-
senting their best interests, then the public will vote that person 
out of office and will elect a better representative. 
Upon judicial review, courts should give a great amount of defer-
ence to an elected land use board's decision. Overturning the decision 
would require a clear showing of fraud, criminal activity, conflict of 
interest, or lack of rational relationship. In this manner, courts would 
bring ex parte communications out into the open so elected land use 
board members and their constituents would know, from the outset, 
that communication is encouraged. Ultimately, consistent treatment 
of ex parte communications would strengthen public confidence. 
Judicial review of ex parte communications is an area of confusion 
and uncertainty in local land use planning. California has attempted 
to bring order to the treatment of ex parte communications by 
defining the standard of review based on the type of decision made 
by a land use board. While California has a viable solution, this 
Comment suggests another alternative. Instead of a decision-based 
go outside the administrative record in reviewing administrative agency action. S. REIGEL & 
P. OWEN, supra note 151, at § 5.2.2. 
217 Comment, supra note 56, at 141. 
218 See, e.g., Fairfield v. Superior Court, supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
219 See supra note 213. 
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standard, local governments should define ex parte communications 
and incorporate the definition into zoning legislation so that deci-
sionmakers understand the issue. Then courts should base the stan-
dard of judicial review for ex parte communications on whether the 
land use board is elected or appointed. Courts should prohibit 
apppointed land use board members from engaging in ex parte com-
munictions, and any violation should be subject to de novo judicial 
review where courts apply an appearance of fairness standard. 
Courts should encourage elected land use board members to engage 
in ex parte communications and hold them to a standard akin to the 
clear showing of bias standard, where only fraud, criminal activity 
or conflict of interest will cause the court to vacate a decision because 
of an ex parte communication. Unlike the current state court treat-
ment of ex parte communications, this proposed standard of review 
is much less ambiguous and allows elected and appointed land use 
board members to carry out their traditional government functions. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The state courts' current treatment of ex parte communications 
in local land use decisions does not further public confidence in the 
decisionmaking process. Confidence becomes more important as mu-
nicipalities enact land use ordinances to restrict landowners' personal 
freedom to use their land as they see fit. In effect, land use ordi-
nances sever development rights from property rights, and this 
separation has created a system of land use controls that conflicts 
with our society's view of property rights. Property owners become 
discontented with the government when land use ordinances appear 
to be applied arbitrarily or inconsistently. Confusion creates an in-
centive to circumvent the system. Board member contact with in-
terested parties outside of the hearing via ex parte communications 
adds fuel to the fire either way: cutting people off from talking to 
their representatives or giving people the inside track with "impar-
tial" administrators. Severe and unjustified deprivation of property 
rights may result when a land use board does not make a carefully 
considered decision in a particular situation. Also, if the public does 
not see the fairness and necessity behind land use decisions, public 
disillusionment and discontentment increases. 
Certainty is necessary to encourage people to invest in land. De-
velopers and neighbors have a right to rely on the decisions of land 
use boards that affect their decisions to buy and sell property. State 
courts, however, fail to provide the certainty needed in the land use 
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area by applying a standard that allows or prohibits ex parte com-
munications based on a land use board's final decision. 
Land use board members and the public often do not know how a 
reviewing court will treat communications that take place outside of 
the formal land use hearing. Land use board members need clear 
standards and guidelines for their conduct in order to restore confi-
dence and certainty in land use decisionmaking. This Comment thus 
advocates the application of the traditional notions of legislative and 
administrative standards regarding ex parte communications to the 
area of land use law. Because of the nature of their position, courts 
should encourage elected land use officials to communicate with in-
dividuals in the community. These elected officers will thus be able 
to make land use decisions with the best interests of the municipality 
in mind. The electoral process will monitor elected land use officials. 
In contrast, courts should discourage appointed land use board 
officials from discussing board issues outside of their immediate staff. 
These officers do not have an affirmative elected duty to represent 
constituents, but can still work for the public good in applying land 
use statutes and developing regulations without engaging in ex parte 
communications. Judicial rules of due process, rather than the stan-
dards of elected officials, will guide appointed land use board mem-
bers. This application of traditional legislative and administrative 
standards of ex parte review is essential to restore integrity and 
clarity to the land use decisionmaking process. 
